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Introduction 
On November 3, 1995, David Morales was arrested outside a Los Angeles Police 
Station for being under the influence of and in possession of PCP. His wife had brought him 
to the police station asking for help. Morales was convicted and sentenced to twenty years to 
life in prison for the crime. This case was appealed all the way to the California Supreme 
Court on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct. During his summation, the prosecutor told 
the jury to consider, when deciding on the possession charge, that Morales was under the 
influence of PCP. Though the jury was informed that intoxication alone is not sufficient 
evidence to convict someone of possession, the prosecutor asked them how someone could 
become under the influence of a controlled substance without possessing it. 
The seven justices of the California Supreme Court wrote three opinions in People vs. 
Morales1. The controversy in the case was over whether the prosecutor had presented a case 
which was "legally incorrect" (7). The appellate defense attorney argued that the prosecutor 
had mislead the jury about the law governing PCP possession. In the majority opinion, 
Justice Mosk stated that while the prosecutor may have misstated the law, the court did 
present correct legal theory to the jury. According to Justice Mosk, it was the defense 
attorney's responsibility to point out this misconduct to the court. Since counsel made no 
objection, the claim was waived. Justice Mosk went on to interpret the prosecutor's 
summation not to be misleading. Justice Mosk noted, however, that the decision was a close 
call. 
1 See People vs. Morales S059461. 
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Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Kennard wrote that by constantly 
suggesting that the defendant could not become intoxicated without being guilty of 
possession, the prosecutor clearly did commit prosecutorial misconduct. Justice Kennard 
agreed with the majority, however, that to overturn the conviction, the defense attorney 
would have had to make an objection during the trial. The dissenting opinion by Justice 
Brown stated that the prosecutor used erroneous legal theory in his summation, and it is 
impossible for the reviewing court to determine whether the jury came to the guilty verdict 
on erroneous theory, and thus the decision must be reversed. 
It is rare to see three opinions in a state supreme court. Nevertheless, while there is 
little disconsensus on state supreme courts, there is some disconsensus. Herein, I examine 
disconsensus on state supreme courts. During my study I found California to be among the 
states with the least amount of consensus on the state supreme court. I also found that 
California employed more law clerks than any other state in my study. It is my contention 
that California enjoyed so many disconsensuses because of the amount of law clerks 
employed by the Court. I hypothesize that justices engage in dissent based on the amount of 
resources available. When justices have more clerks they are able to write more opinions 
because there are more clerks to assist with opinion writing duties. 
The Tradition of Dissent 
This nation has a very strong tradition of dissent. In the judiciary, dissent has severed 
an important role, and led to significant ends. In the landmark 1896 U.S. Supreme Court 
case Plessy v. Ferguson (163 U.S. 537) the Court upheld "separate but equal" segregation as 
constitutional. In a 7-1 decision, Justice Harlan wrote a powerful dissent that would go down 
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in history. In his dissent, Justice Harlan correctly projected that "the judgment this day 
rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in 
the Dred Scott Case." He also wrote that the Louisiana statute which prohibited African 
Americans from riding in the same railroad cars as whites was written to keep blacks out of 
white cars and not the other way around. Because of the underlying intent of the law, Harlan 
finds it to be in violation of the 14th Amendment. 
Justice Harlan's dissent provided the foundation for Chief Justice Warren's majority 
opinion in Brown v. Board of Education (347 U.S. 483) 58 years later. Knowing how 
disconsensus can affect the power of an opinion the Warren Court worked very hard to reach 
a strong consensus, so that the decision would be less likely to be reversed in the future. 
In light of this, it seems relevant that there were two dissenting2 opinions written in 
the Morales case in California. David Morales was sentenced to serve twenty years to life in 
prison. These two opinions could one day be a strong basis for a future appeal. Had Morales 
been convicted in a state with a stronger consensual tradition he likely would have a smaller 
chance at having his conviction overturned one day. 
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes once said, "We are under the Constitution, but 
the Constitution is what the judges say it is" (Peretti 1999, 3). This is a profound statement. 
Since it is up to judges to determine what the law means, they are in a unique position to 
change law as they see fit. They may change the law because they believe it is not in line 
with the original intent of the constitution, or possibly because it seems inconsistent with the 
direction of the country. Alternatively, justices may make decisions based on their own 
policy preferences. The media coverage of Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito's recent 
2 Here, and throughout I use dissent in reference to both dissenting and concurring opinions. 
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senate confirmation hearings make it clear that it is widely accepted that the policy 
preferences of individual justices matter. However, we do not see as much of this sort of 
controversy surrounding judicial appointments in state courts. Is this simply because people 
pay less attention to state government than federal, or are people generally less concerned 
with the politics of lower court justices? 
Perhaps personal policy preference is a less important criterion for state supreme 
court justices. The controversy may also be mitigated by the assumption that their policy 
preferences are more in line with those of the citizens of the states. Scott D. Gerber and 
Keeok Park argued that the United States Supreme Court issues larger numbers of dissenting 
opinions because of the unique institutional context of the Court (1997, 390). If the amount 
of disconsensus on the U.S. Supreme Court is unique, it may suggest something about the 
overall role of judicial decision-making. Do justices on lower courts reach more 
consensuses? If they reach more consensuses, the important question is why they behave so 
differently from the high court. 
Bradley Best accredits disconsensus in the Supreme Court to the addition of more law 
clerks and support personnel3. In Law Clerks, Support Personnel and the Decline of 
Consensual Norms on the United States Supreme Court (2001), he contends that as the size 
of the staff increased, the justices have less personal interaction with each other. Because 
there is less interaction, there are fewer consensuses. Prior to Professor Best's book, several 
scholars had suggested, but not tested, that something about structure of the Court caused the 
decline in consensual norms. Best provides an in-depth study of the "law clerk" effect, 
3 It is probably worth noting that Professor Best was my advisor and professor while I was an undergraduate at 
Buena Vista University. 
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showing very strong evidence that the size of the staff is correlated with the independence 
among the justices. 
Herein, I intend to apply this theory to state supreme courts. While there have been 
studies on both the institutional setting of state supreme courts and studies on dissensus in 
these courts, no one has ever studied the effect of larger staffs on state supreme courts. As 
Professor Best found a positive correlation between law clerks, support staff and a decline of 
consensual norms on the Supreme Court, I predict I will find a similar correlation between 
law clerks and consensual norms on state supreme courts. My goal is not only to look at the 
empirical and highly quantitative question of whether or not this effect exists in these courts, 
but also the normative question of whether consensual norms are good or bad. In the end I 
hope to be able to provide prescriptive theory pertaining to how a court should function at the 
institutional level. 
Law Clerks and the United States Supreme Court 
Best explored the Court as a small legislative body. The role of law clerks on the 
Court had become increasingly influential on opinion writing (Best 2002, 2-4). This 
approach comes from Eugene Rostow, who advocates that scholars should look at judicial 
behavior as a set of multi-causal phenomena. Rather than the psychometric treatment of 
judicial decision making, scholars should use inclusive models and pay attention to the 
intuitional and structure features of the legal system (Rostow 1967, 57). 
Best explains the concept of "neo-institutionalism" as the discipline's reconsideration 
of institutional factors as shapers of individual behavior (2002, 11). This has been applied to 
state courts by Paul Brace and Melinda Gann Hall. I discuss their work later, in my section 
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on state courts. Prior to Best, however, neo-institutionalism had not been widely used by 
those who study the U.S. Supreme Court. Scholars did not entirely ignore the institutional 
setting in explaining dissensus on the Court. The trend has been to credit consensus or 
dissensus to the chief justice, turnover on the court, inexperienced justices, the caseload, 
substantive changes to the docket and ideological differences among the justices. Chief 
Justice Hughes encouraged disagreement on his Court and his Court produced more dissents 
than previous Courts. Scholars have seen this as evidence that the chief justice is responsible 
for consensual norms on the Court (Best 2002, 14). 
According to Best, law clerks on the Supreme Court participate in such important 
roles as case selection and opinion writing. He points out that during the time prior to 1886, 
law clerks were not employed by the Supreme Court. The ever growing workload became 
too much for the justices to bear on their own and in 1886, Congress passed the Sundry Civil 
Act, which allowed each justice a stenographic clerk; it was not until the early twentieth 
century that law clerks would become part of each justice's chambers. Over time, the 
institutional role of these clerks has changed. They have gone from simply helping justices 
prepare for oral argument and doing research to their current role of helping select cases to be 
heard and drafting opinions (Best 2002, 35-36). 
In his study, Best tests two general hypotheses: 
HI.  As the number of  law clerks  and support  personnel  ass igned to  the United 
States Supreme Court during the period of 1935 to 1995 has increased, the 
justices' opinion writing behaviors have become increasingly nonconsensual 
H2. Increases in the number of nonconsensual opinions written by the justices 
during the period 1935-1995 is related to the increasing presence of law clerk 
and support personnel on the Court when controlling for changes in the 
ideological composition of the Court, changes in the composition of the 
Court's docket of cases granted plenary review, changes in the degree of 
inexperience on the Court, the frequency of turnover in the Court's 
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membership, changes in the leadership style of Chief Justices, and changes in 
the size of the Court's caseload (2002, 55-56). 
To test the first hypothesis, Professor Best uses quantitative statistics. He tests five 
dependent variables: the total number of opinions written by justices, the number of opinions 
for the Court, the number of separate opinions written by the justices, the number of 
dissenting opinions written by the justices and the number of concurring opinions written by 
the justices; and two independent variables: the number of law clerks assigned to the Court 
and the number of support personnel assigned to the Court. To test the second hypothesis, 
Best limits the range of dependent variables to measure of dissenting, concurring and 
separate opinions. This allows him to compare his data directly to previous research vis-à-
vis several multiple regression models, using as independent variable the number of law 
clerks, support personnel, and competing explanations of dissensus. 
Ultimately, Best concludes that the presence of law clerks on the Court has altered the 
justices' tolerance for consensus seeking behavior. He does not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the numbers of support personnel and number of concurring opinions; 
however, he does find a statistically significant relationship between the numbers of support 
personnel and the number of dissenting opinions. Overall, staff size is related to the number 
of different opinions written, so Best is confident in saying that the number of support staff is 
linked to the broad patterns of disagreement that prevent the Court from building strong 
majority opinion collations. 
8 
Reductionist Models of Supreme Court Behavior 
Though it is very important to pay attention to the institutional setting of a court, it is 
equally important not to forget reductionist models, as they help explain individual voting 
behavior. Reductionist models are models which reduce many cases down to a few simple 
variables to create a clear, parsimonious way to compare across many different cases. The 
attitudinal and rational choice models are two such reductionist models and are particularly 
important to this study. These models also give us a better understanding of the individuals 
who make up each court, by showing what causes them to vote a certain way. 
In The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model Revisited, Jeffrey Segal and Harold 
Spaeth outlines the attitudinal model of Supreme Court behavior. The attitudinal model is a 
reaction to the legal model of Supreme Court behavior, which holds that the Supreme Court 
looks at the facts in light of precedent, plain meaning and original intent, and decides based 
on these alone. The attitudinal model holds that the Court looks at the facts in light of the 
ideological attitudes and values of the justices. Conservative justices cast votes that further a 
conservative ideology. Liberal justices cast votes that further a liberal ideology (Segal and 
Spaeth 2002, 86). 
This model borrows from the legal realists of the 1920s as well as concepts of 
political science, psychology and economics. According to Segal and Spaeth, the legal 
realists, led by Karl Llewellyn and Jerome Frank, questioned the motivations of the 
conservative jurisprudence of the time. The legal realists saw that the law was not socially 
neutral. Other legal scholars of the time insisted that a judge's private views did not come 
into play and that the law is autonomous; judging was the act of finding the law, not making 
it. Legal realists hold that judging is inevitably lawmaking, because the results of legal 
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judgment ultimately determine what the law is. This, according to the legal realists, is not 
because judges attempt to seek power for themselves, but rather that "judicial creation" is an 
inevitable effect of an ever-changing society (Segal and Spaeth 2002, 87). 
If justices, indeed, are political actors, rational choice theory might help to explain 
how they make decisions. Rational choice theory seems to have invaded every area of 
political science. William Riker describes two elements of the rational choice model: 
1. Actors are able to order their alternative goals, values, tastes, and 
strategies. This means that the revelation of preference is transitive... 
2. Actors choose from available alternatives so as to maximize their 
satisfaction (Riker 1990, 172). 
Since rational choice analysis assumes actors are experts, it assumes that actors will, indeed, 
make value maximizing decisions. This has been criticized in many fields, such as 
international relations, because actors do not have perfect knowledge, and often make 
decisions which do not produce the best outcome. 
When studying judicial decisions, the model seems to fit the requirements of rational 
choice much better. The events of the Court are defined so clearly that the cases are actually 
called 'cases'. The players are certainly experts. The actors are considered dispassionate 
(though if you buy into the attitudinal model they may not be so dispassionate.) The game 
has clear rules. Looking at the Court through the rational choice model, we can easily plug 
in the addition of law clerks and see how that would affect which decision is value 
maximizing. As Best writes, the addition of law clerks to the Supreme Court decreased 
interaction between the individual justices. I explore how rational choice analysis can 
enhance our understanding of Best's law clerk theory. 
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Segal and Spaeth divide rational choice analysis in the Supreme Court into two 
camps. The internal camp focuses on interaction between justices. The external camp 
focuses on constraints imposed on the court by external political actors (Segal and Spaeth 
2002, 100). For the purposes of this research, I am more interested in the internal camp. The 
reason for this is that when looking at the law clerk effect on consensual norms, it is more 
important to explore internal behavior. Admittedly, though, since external pressure may 
affect voting behavior, it may also affect consensual norms to an extent. 
Walter Murphy is perhaps the most important scholar in the internal camp. In 
Elements of Judicial Strategy, Murphy explains the strategies a justice must take on in order 
to achieve his or her policy goals. Murphy says that a Supreme Court justice must behave 
like any leader in politics. When furthering a policy goal, the justice must strategically act to 
gain the endorsements of his or her peers, but also take steps to ensure that subordinates 
(lower courts) will accept and apply the policy decision. A strategic minded justice should 
use the same strategy when influencing lower courts as when persuading his or her associates 
(Murphy 1964, 91-92). In this, Murphy looks at the entire judicial structure as a 
bureaucracy. This is relevant to my research because Murphy views the Court in light of the 
group behavior, which is essentially what I am doing. 
Murphy also explores the ethics of judicial strategy. It seems almost like a loaded 
question to ask if strategic interaction is ethical, since we are trained to think that the 
judiciary is, and should be, completely independent of politics. Murphy believes this 
stemmed from the fact that justices have to be the impartial voice of the law while at the 
same time writing opinions which are supposed to provide justice to the people. The obvious 
question is whether a justice is acting ethically when pursuing specific policy interests. 
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Murphy points out that justices are inevitably policy makers, since they must ultimately 
either uphold or strike down legislation (Murphy 1964, 176-178). 
Another important text injudicial strategic interaction is The Choices Justices Make 
by Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. In Choices, Epstein and Knight attempts to lend more 
systematic evidence to Murphy's theories. Their strategic account of judicial decision 
making comprises three main ideas: "justices' actions are directed toward the attainment of 
goals; justices are strategic; and institutions structure justices' interaction" (Epstein and 
Knight 1998, 10-11). The first idea is not much of a departure from the attitudinal model. It 
also follows very closely to rational choice theory. When making a decision, a political actor 
will choose the option believed to best promote his or her own policy preferences. This 
assumes that the actor can rank alternatives in terms of predictable outcomes. Epstein and 
Knight point to examples of Supreme Court justices voting against certain policy preferences 
which they hold in order to better further policy goals which they value more. In this sense 
justices are behaving strategically. The third assumption is very important. Epstein and 
Knight claim that the institutional setting of the Supreme Court determines the interaction 
between justices. When justices write opinions, they have to write them so that other justices 
will sign on to them and when they hand down decision, they have to be written so that other 
institutions will see them as binding (Epstein and Knight 1998, 10-13). 
These rational choice and strategic interaction studies have primarily been used on the 
U.S. Supreme Court. Scholars such as Murphy, Epstein, and Knight have done much to 
show how U.S. Supreme Court justices behave as strategic actors. This would only 
contribute to my theory about the effect of law clerks on dissenting opinion writing if I found 
the same strategic behavior in state courts. 
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The strategic interaction model fits in very well with the Best's law clerk theory. If 
justices behave strategically, it would seem more likely that the addition or subtraction of law 
clerks would affect dissent. In other words, a non-strategic justice, who is a blind arbiter of 
the law, would not make strategic calculations about prioritizing their resources. A strategic 
justice will assign clerks to work on cases which he or she believes they will be most 
effective. If state supreme court justices behave the same way as U.S. Supreme Court 
justices, the model should also work in the state courts. All judges and justices make choices 
when deciding cases. Ultimately, their job is to make decisions that affect policy. Whether 
the justice is a blind arbiter of the law or a strategic actor, he or she must make a decision. 
State Supreme Courts 
There has been some scholarly work on state supreme court behavior and structure, 
but not nearly as much as the U.S. Supreme Court. Therefore, most of the models I use are 
adapted from work on the U.S. Supreme Court. There exists, however, some very relevant 
and interesting studies on states supreme courts. Above, I mentioned Brace and Hull's work. 
In "Integrated Models of Dissent," they look at integrated models of judicial dissent at the 
individual level. They approach this from a neo-institutional perspective, taking into account 
the attitudinal, jurisprudential, and contextual approaches (Brace and Hull 1993, 916-917). 
They find that justices choose to dissent, not merely on attitudinal differences, case facts or 
contextual forces, but also on all of these interacting with the institutional setting (Brace and 
Hull 1993, 930). 
Another piece by Brace and Hull entitled '"Haves' vs. Have Nots' in State Supreme 
Courts: Allowing Docket Space and Wins in Power Asymmetric Cases" suggests that factors 
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other than ideology determine the way state supreme court justices vote. This, of course, 
furthers their early research suggesting that such contextual and institutional factors 
determined this behavior. In this article, Brace and Hall examine state supreme court cases 
in which there are asymmetric power relationships between litigants. They look at how 
much a court devotes their docket to these cases and what determines how they rule in favor 
of one group as opposed to the other. They examine 6750 cases in state supreme courts in 
1996. In this study they find that contextual factors can shape the agenda and allowing wins 
for underprivileged advocates. To look at this, scholars must look beyond the attitudinal 
preferences of the individual justices. Factors such as influencing lower court, 
professionalism, state population and state public opinion play into whether or not a court 
will function as a redistributive body (Brace and Hull 2001, 105-108). This suggests that the 
institutional role of state supreme courts is very different than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Another article by Professor Brace (this time with Laura Langer), "The Florida 
Supreme Court in the 2000 Presidential Election: Ambiguity, Ideology, and Signaling in a 
Judicial Hierarchy" looks at the 2000 Bush v. Gore case in the Florida Supreme Court. This 
study implies that in high profile cases, state court justices may vote along ideological lines. 
Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court also decided this case along ideological lines. 
The more conservative member's of the court broke the conservative tradition to support the 
President's equal protection rights. The liberal block, on the other hand, voted against equal 
protection, in favor of a candidate who is more in line with their ideological views. 
Generally, when it comes to equal protection cases, the court is divided the other way around. 
Brace and Langer look at the same case in the Florida Supreme Court. They provide one of 
the few studies where a state court is broken down into the individual ideology of the 
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justices. Where it is possible that state courts may be tied by the constitution and previous 
Supreme Court decisions, it appears here that the Florida Supreme Court was also voted 
along attitudinal lines (Brace and Langer, 648-650). This indicates that within the 
institutional setting of state supreme courts, justices are able to vote on ideological lines. 
Another interesting piece of state supreme court behavior is Neil Roman's "The Role 
of State Supreme Courts in Judicial Policy Making." This is an application of Walter 
Murphy's theories to the State courts. Using examples of criminal law, Romans looks at the 
institutional role of state supreme courts. He focuses on how state supreme courts had 
reacted to U.S. Supreme Court decisions concerning the admissibility of pre-trial 
confessions. Romans points to another role of state supreme courts, which is to interpret 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions within their own states. The U.S. Supreme Court hands down 
decisions and it is up to lower courts to interpret them correctly. When state supreme courts, 
serving in their appellate role, hear cases which have been decided on Supreme Court 
precedent, it is up to the state supreme court to determine whether that case law has been 
interpreted correctly (Romans 1974, 38-40). 
All of this literature has helped to explain the institutional setting of state supreme 
courts and why state judges vote the way they do. State supreme courts have many roles to 
play, both as intermediaries between lower courts and the U.S. Supreme Court, and as courts 
themselves. While they seem to vote strategically at times, these courts are clearly more 
institutionally limited than their federal counterpart. Still, the evidence implies that there is 
some strategic voting going on in state supreme courts. Since justices do behave 
strategically, it is likely that if the presence of law clerks affects dissent on the U.S. Supreme 
Court, it will similarly affect dissent on state supreme courts. 
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State Supreme Court Staff 
In 2000, National Center for State Courts published The Work of Appellate Court 
Legal Staff by Roger A. Hanson, Carol R. Flango and Randall M. Hansen. This document 
was the first national account of the operations of appellate court legal staff. Hanson, et. al. 
systematically surveyed every appellate court in the United States, both state and federal. In 
the study, they document the basic work areas of the staff and the tasks performed by each 
group. These groups were identified as law clerks, central staff attorneys and clerks of court 
(Hanson, et al. 2000, 1-2). 
The National Center set out with four objectives: to determine if generalizable work 
areas could be determined; to develop a comparative view of the relative amount of time 
each group spends on a broad range of tasks; to gauge the similarities and differences 
between the nature of the work of each type of legal staff; and to see how the pattern of time 
commitments made by each type of legal staff holds under different conditions, such as 
different courts and different size caseloads (Hanson et al. 2000, 3-4). 
Hanson, et al., conclude that the work of appellate court legal staff can be divided in 
to nine work areas: assisting justices in opinion preparation, handling cases at procedural 
events, training staff and court management, prehearing assistance, researching substantive 
motions and applications for writs, attending decisional conferences, conducting settlement 
conferences, and preparing memoranda on discretionary petitions. These work areas are 
generally the domain of one type of legal staff. Law Clerks tend to assist justices in 
preparing opinions. Clerks of court are generally involved in court management, but law 
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clerks often play a small role there too. Staff attorneys play much more diverse roles than 
other staff (Hanson, et. al. 2000, 5). 
The study further distinguishes between short term law clerks and career law clerks. 
Initially, law clerks were appointed exclusively to short term appointments so that they 
would not create undue influences over justices. This gave way to the appointment of long 
term clerks when some justices prefers career law clerks with more experience and 
knowledge of the justices' personal style. Career clerks required less training and 
supervision (Hanson et al. 2000, 8-9). 
Hanson et al. point out that there is contention among professionals and scholars 
concerning the desired role of a law clerk. Some considered a law clerk's input a crucial and 
advantageous component of a justice's decision. According to this camp, clerks provide an 
alternative view for the justice. They also advocate alternatives against a judge's natural 
resistance. Another view is that the purpose of a law clerk is not to enhance the capacity for 
change on the court, but rather to work in a limited role for a limited length of time compared 
to a justice. While one view allows for law clerks to have a great deal of influence over the 
court, the other prefers that clerks provide only independent support to a justice. However, 
whatever task a law clerk is performing, the very nature of the clerk's position will require 
the clerk to make some sort of judgment which would be likely to affect the outcome of a 
case. According to Hanson et al., the question of differences in the roles of short-term and 
career clerks is still unknown. They suggested, however, that it can be inferred that career 
clerks have more influence on courts (Hanson et al. 2000, 8-10). 
Assisting justices in writing opinions, according to the survey responses of The 
National Center's study, was the most similar duty across courts. That is to say, the process 
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of this task was more similar across courts than the process of other tasks. It also found that 
across courts, law clerks (both career and short-term) dedicate more of their time to this task 
than any other type of staff. Generally a clerk would review the record, draft an opinion 
(usually the facts of the case), consult a justice on an individual case, check footnotes and 
proof mandates (Hanson, et al. 2000, 39). 
Since my study is an exploration of dissent, understanding the duty of assisting 
justices in writing opinions is paramount. If clerks spend a disproportionate amount of time 
assisting justices in writing opinions, it would support my theory that the addition of more 
law clerk to a court causes justices to write more opinions. 
Summary 
In formulating his theory, Professor Best brings the concept of neo-institutionalism, 
which Brace and Hull apply to state courts, to the U.S. Supreme Court. Essentially, in 
formulating my theory, I am taking Best's law clerk theory to state supreme courts, bringing 
the concept of neo-institutionalism full circle. Best uses quantitative statistics to test whether 
or not law clerks and support staff affect dissenting opinion writing in the U.S. Supreme 
Court. I use similar statistics to test this relationship in state supreme courts. I also test the 
relationship between caseload and dissenting opinions, in order to test my theory that it is 
actually limited resources which affect dissent. 
Segal and Spaeth's attitudinal model seems to hold up in light of the writings on state 
supreme courts by Brace and Hull. When combined with Walter Murphy's writings on 
judicial strategy this becomes relevant to the law clerk theory. If justices are working to 
promote policy preferences, and to promote those policy preferences justices must work 
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strategically within the court, the presence of law clerks is very important. As we have seen, 
law clerks play a large roll in drafting opinions. If voicing dissent is a necessary step towards 
social progress, a justice with a larger staff and more law clerks will be better equipped to 
maneuver within the court to promote certain policy preferences. However, the presence of 
law clerks may create additional obstacles injudicial strategy. If a justice is attempting to 
craft an opinion so that more justices will sign on to it, the opinion may have to conform 
more closely to a neutral opinion if the additional law clerks make colleagues more likely to 
write dissenting opinions. 
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Research Design 
My research is intended to be an examination of judicial voting behavior in State 
Supreme Courts. I build on Bradley Best's research in Law Clerks, Support Personnel and 
the Decline of Consensual Norms on the United States Supreme Court. In Law Clerks, Best 
correlated the rise in dissents and concurrences on the Supreme Court to the rise in law clerks 
and support personnel employed by the Court. I explore this phenomenon in State Supreme 
Courts. I predicted that courts with larger staffs should issue more opinions per case than 
courts with small staffs. Any inconsistencies between my findings and Best's conclusions 
may point to something about the institutional setting of the state supreme courts that causes 
them to behave that way. 
I operationalize consensus by counting how many dissenting opinions are written per 
case in a given state court. I create an OLS regression model using number of opinions as 
my dependent variable and number of law clerks and caseload as my independent variables4. 
In order to test my theory that limited resources affect dissenting opinion writing I tested two 
general hypotheses. The first is that courts with more law clerks have more dissent. The 
second is that courts with larger caseloads have less dissent. 
4 It is likely that there are other factors that would help to explain nonconsensual opinion writing. I looked at 
six other independent variables: number of justices, number of support staff, state population, political polarity 
and individual state (for which I used dummy variables). These variables did not fit into the model and all either 
reduced my R2 or made it more difficult to see the relationship between the variables I used. Of all of them I 
was mostly surprised to see that political polarity seemed to be irrelevant. It seemed that the level of political 
controversy in a state would most likely affect my study. I was also surprised that the state dummy variables 
were insignificant. The only dummy variables which approached significance were California and New Jersey. 
This is interesting, however, because California and New Jersey were the only states to have more than one case 
with 3 opinions as well as the only states to have more than two clerks per justices. 
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Sample Selection and Data Collection 
My sample consists of ten state supreme courts. These states were selected in an 
effort to control for as many variables as I could. I collected information on the number of 
justices and their election methods from the state supreme court websites. Some states hold 
partisan elections, others hold non-partisan elections. Some state legislatures appointed 
justices, other states rely on gubernatorial appointment. 
Drawing from the 28 states with seven justices I narrowed my sample to states where 
justices are appointed by the governor, as this is most similar to the presidential appointment 
of justices in the United States Supreme Court. The states sampled are: California, Colorado, 
Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska and New Jersey. The 
sample includes populous states like California, New Jersey and Massachusetts as well as 
smaller states like Iowa, Nebraska and Maine. The states are also pretty equally distributed 
geographically. 
Initially, I attempted to collect this data will be by contacting the courts directly. I 
called each court with a short questionnaire. The questionnaire consisted of the following 
questions: 
1. How large is the total number of support staff of the court? [This should 
include the administrative assistant to the chief justice, employees of the 
Clerk of Court's office, the Marshal (or equivalent), police officers 
working under supervision of the Marshal, The Reporter of Decisions (or 
equivalent) and the Reporter's assistants, the Court Librarians staff, the 
Court Curator, additional personal staff (excluding law clerks) assigned to 
each justice, and employees of the Court's Legal Office5.] 
2. How many law clerks does the court employ? 
3. Are law clerks assigned to each justice? If not how are they assigned? 
4. How large is the court's caseload? 
5 Definition of Support staff is taken from Best's research design (pg. 62). 
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5. Has the size of the court's staff or the number of law clerks employed by 
the court changed significantly in the last five year? 
While this survey initially seemed successful, it became increasingly difficult to keep a 
consistent definition of who should be included in the staff, since the structure of each state 
judiciary was different. In light of the problems of the survey, I instead used the data from 
the study conducted by the National Center for State Courts. This provided a uniform 
definition of Law Clerks and Staff across courts. Still, I include the survey because 
contacting the courts gave me insight into their operations. 
For the 2001 session of each of the ten courts, I coded every ten cases published by 
the courts. In all, I coded 148 cases. 
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Data Analysis 
Table 1: OLS Regression Model Results. 





Clerks 0.0067** -0.003 
Caseload -0.0023* -0.001 
Constant 1.48 -0.23 
N = 148 
Adj R2 = 0.1031 
**p< 05, *p< 10 
Dependent Variable = Number of Opinions 
Looking to the table 1, we see a negative relationship between number of opinions 
and caseload which is consistent with my second hypothesis. The table shows, at the .10 
significance level, a relationship of -.0023 between caseload and nonconsensual opinion 
writing. This may seem small, but opinions per case, the dependent variable, only vary from 
one to three. The variation is small, but there is variation. The table also illustrates a 
positive relationship between clerks and number of opinions, which is consistent with my 
first hypothesis. This relationship, at the .05 level of significance, is .0067. Put together, this 
suggests that justices write dissenting opinions when they have more resources. 
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Figure 1 is a graphical representation of the effect law clerks have on opinion 
writing. It is clear from this graph that states with more law clerks publish more dissenting 
opinions. While the graph dips down between 14 and 11 clerks the general trend is 
undeniable, the graph shows that courts with 21 or more clerks write many more opinions. 
opinons 
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Similarly, Figure 2 shows a graphical representation of the relationship between 
caseload and opinion writing. It is clear from the graph that as caseload goes down, 
consensus goes down. However, the line does slope back up, showing the courts writing 
three opinions have larger caseloads than those writing only two. This is because of outliers, 
which I will explain in my analysis. 
Looking back to table 1, we can see that, with an adjusted R2 of only . 1031, the model 
explains less than 10% of the dependent variable's variance. Again, there are probably 
factors which I was unable to test that may be able to explain more. Still, I show a negative 
relationship where I predicted a negative and a positive relationship where I predicted a 
1.00 2.00 3.00 
opinons 
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positive. My model shows no fire, but there is smoke, and it seems more likely than not that 
there is a causal relationship between clerks and caseload and opinion writing. 
This model helps us to understand dissent. It tells us that not only do courts with 
more law clerks write more dissenting opinions, but if the court has a lower case load, 
members will write more non consensual opinions. This reveals that when given more 
opportunity, justices will write more opinions. I see two possibilities for this. The first is 
that justices simply do not have time to write opinions and the presence of law clerks with a 
smaller case load gives them that time. Without enough law clerks and larger caseload, 
justices will not write opinions, but still disagree. The other possibility is that justices on 
courts with larger case loads or fewer clerks will simple have more interaction with each 
other. This would suggest that justices feel social pressure to conform. 
The model illustrates a statistically significant relationship between number law 
clerks and opinion writing (with a p-value less than .05) as well as a relationship which 
approaches traditional levels of significance between caseload and opinion writing (with a p-
value less than .10). This supports my theory that justices write dissenting opinions when 
they have more resources available. 
Within the data there is a lot of interesting things which support my overall theory 
that limited resources affect dissent. While the model I created demonstrates this 
phenomenon more parsimoniously, it is also important to break down the data state by state 
in order to understand how the theory works. 
California and New Jersey were the only states with more than three opinions written 
in any cases. The California Supreme Court employs 68 clerks and in 11 cases surveyed, 
they wrote 18 opinions. The New Jersey Supreme Court has 21 clerks. In 12 cases, the 
26 
justices of the New Jersey Supreme Court wrote 19 opinions. New Jersey employs three 
clerks per justice. It seems that in terms of law clerks, three is the magic number as courts 
with only 2 clerks per justice do not produce as many dissents. 
Iowa and Kansas both have only one clerk per justice. Both states also enjoy a great 
deal of consensus. The justices of the Iowa Supreme Court wrote 23 opinions in twenty 
cases. Similarly, Kansas Supreme Court justices wrote 20 opinions in 18 cases. Again, this 
is consistent with my hypothesis. 
The two outliers are Maine and Massachusetts. Maine has eleven clerks; however, in 
17 cases, Maine wrote 17 opinions. There was not one nonconsensual opinion. Maine is the 
only state with no disconsensus. To this I offer a simple explanation. In my early phone 
survey I learned that save for two clerks, all other law clerks on the Maine Supreme Judicial 
Court are appointed to serve only two years. In light of the assertion by Hanson et. al, I 
believe that the clerks in Maine are less experienced and not familiar enough with the justices 
to have the same affect on consensual norms as long-term clerks in other states. 
Massachusetts also experiences this amount of consensus. On this court there are two 
clerks per justice. In 19 cases, Massachusetts only wrote 19 opinions. While my model 
does not explain this, the most likely explanation is that Massachusetts also uses only short-
term clerks. I suspect this because the NCSC study explained that justices farm more duties 
out to long-term clerks. As in Maine, it is probably the absence of long term clerks that 
cause this phenomenon. Another possibly explanation for this amount of consensus is the 
large size of Massachusetts' caseload. Again, there are probably variables outside my model 
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that would explain the high levels of consensus in both Massachusetts and Maine, but any 
attempt to solve that problem would be pure speculation6. 
The other variable which approached traditional levels of significance was the court's 
caseload. In my sample, despite being the largest state with the largest staff, California has 
the third smallest caseload (more cases than only Colorado and Missouri). California fits my 
model incredibly well; they have a lot of clerks and a small case load. Justices, therefore, 
have plenty of time to write non-consensual opinions and plenty of clerks to draft those 
opinions. 
Similarly, Massachusetts has the largest caseload in my sample. While 
Massachusetts was troubling within my model when looking at law clerks, when looking at 
caseload it fits very well. It would seem that despite having two clerks per justice, the 
caseload in Massachusetts is so large that it prevents justices from writing dissenting 
opinions. This would make perfect sense, except that halfway across the country, with only 
one short term-clerk per justice and publishing opinions for 7 less cases than Massachusetts, 
the Iowa Supreme Court published 3 dissenting opinions in twenty cases. While both Iowa 
and Massachusetts show support for the caseload theory, it seems strange that Iowa would 
produce more opinions than Massachusetts, since Massachusetts has double the law clerks 
and a similar caseload. 
Maine, as well, is less puzzling when it comes to the relationship between its caseload 
and opinion writing. Maine had the fifth largest caseload in my sample in 2001. While, it 
does not have the largest caseload, it did hear more cases than most states with large numbers 
6 Initially I had expected the polarity in Massachusetts to be the cause of this. A1 Gore won Massachusetts by 
over 27%. I predicted that the consensus would be caused by a relatively concurrent liberal view throughout the 
state. Unfortunately in my OLS regression I did not find polarity to be a helpful variable. 
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of disconsensus. While is still unclear why Maine enjoys the amount of consensus it does, it 
is not unusual that the Court should enjoy a certain tradition of consensual norms. 
Concerning the caseload theory, Missouri seems to be the most puzzling. Missouri 
had the smallest caseload in the sample, and did enjoy a reasonable amount of disconsensus 
publishing 12 opinions in 9 cases. While this suggests there is some tradition of dissent on 
the Missouri Supreme Court, it does not compare to the disconsensus in California and New 
Jersey. This is most easily explained by my data analysis which exemplifies that the 
relationship between clerks and opinions is stronger than the relationship between opinions 
and caseload. Despite Missouri's small caseload, the fact that the court has less than three 
clerks per case prevent it from writing as many non consensual opinions as New Jersey and 
California. If true, this helps to explain the curve in figure 2. 
Another difference which my model does not account for is the differences in these 
individual cases. Each of these courts hear a different amount of cases in their original 
jurisdiction. They also hear cases on appeal from different lower tiered courts. The amount 
of appeals a case must go through to get to the state supreme court would affect the average 
amount of controversy of cases reaching the court. This could also affect consensual opinion 
writing. 
Summary 
My model shows a positive causal relationship between law clerks and opinions as 
well as a negative causal relationship between caseload and opinion writing. While my 
model only explains about 10% of the variance in opinion writing, it does show causal 
relationships. 
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I cannot show that there are not other factors that may contribute more to 
nonconsensual opinion writing. In fact my model even denotes that there are outside 
variables which would explain this variance. Nevertheless, I predicted that courts with more 
clerks would have fewer consensuses and that states with fewer cases would have fewer 
consensuses. This is exactly what my model shows. 
Based on my analysis, I believe that justices who have fewer resources to write 
dissenting opinions are more likely to conform to the view of the majority than justices who 
have more resources such as a larger staff with a smaller caseload. I show that in the ideal 
situation of a large staff and a small caseload dissenting opinions are abundant. I also show 
that in a non ideal situation of a large caseload and a small staff, dissenting opinions are 
almost non existent. In situations between the extremes, I saw varying degrees of opinion 
writing which cannot be entirely explained by my model. Still the overall findings of my 
model are consistent across courts. 
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Normative Question 
As I stated above, I am not only interested in determining whether or not the presence 
of law clerks and support staff on state supreme courts affects opinion writing. I am also 
interested in addressing the normative question of how Courts ought to be structured in light 
of my findings. It is my contention that disconsensus in the judiciary is good for democracy 
and that if, indeed, the addition of law clerks causes courts to produce dissenting opinions, 
then courts (and the legislature who control their structure) should strive to have enough law 
clerks and support staff to provide their justices with the tools necessary to produce more 
opinions. In other words, I would rather a justice write a possibly unnecessary opinion than 
wish to write an opinion, but be dissuaded due to a lack of time and resources necessary to 
voice his or her concerns. 
An article, appearing in the August 2006 issue of The Atlantic by Stuart Taylor Jr. 
and Benjamin Wittes, contends that the job of a United States Supreme Court Justice is 
among the most powerful and cushy jobs in the nation. Taylor and Wittes cite books written 
by sitting justices as well as the amount of vacations taken by justices. They also assert that 
Justices are too entangled in public feuds over ideology and leave important legal questions 
unresolved. Their solution is to eliminate law clerks. This, according to Taylor and Wittes, 
would force justices to focus on legal issues and spend less time pursuing their own policy 
preferences. 
The elimination of law clerks would also force justices to work harder and probably 
retire sooner. The Court now employs more clerks than ever before while handling the 
lightest caseload in modern history. Taylor and Wittes believe this is bad because it causes 
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justices to have too much time on their hands. Most modern Supreme Court justices delegate 
the bulk of or at least much of their opinion writing duties to law clerks. As Taylor and 
Wittes point out, Justice Stevens is the only current U.S. Supreme Court justice who drafts 
his own opinions. Stevens believes that writing the first draft helps him to understand the 
case before him. Taylor and Wittes contend that all justices will behave like Stevens if their 
law clerks are cut back from four to one (Taylor and Wittes 2006, 50). While Taylor and 
Wittes see increased staff as an obstacle for a healthy judiciary, I believe that giving justices 
more time and resources to think through cases and produce more opinions is healthy both 
for the judiciary and for democratic tradition. Taylor and Wittes see the U.S. Supreme Court 
as an example of what not to do in terms of staffing a court. I, on the other hand, think state 
supreme courts would be healthier if they behaved more like the U.S. Supreme Court, in this 
respect. 
While I disagree with Taylor and Wittes contention that the U.S. Supreme Court 
employs too many law clerks, I do believe there could be some merit to their fears. Though I 
do not believe the U.S. Supreme Court, or any state supreme courts, have crossed the 
threshold, there may be an amount of clerks a court could employ which would be counter 
productive. It would probably be unnecessary for any court to employ 100 clerks per 
justices. Though I could not possibly find it in my model, there is likely an upper-bound for 
the effectiveness of additional law clerks. 
In People v. Morales the dissenting opinions may lead to further review of the case. I 
do not make a judgment on whether or not David Morales has been denied justice. Nor do I 
believe scholars should make a habit of voicing opinions on the guilt or innocence of a 
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particular plaintiff; however, I believe the presence of dissenting opinions adds to the 
democratic tradition. 
The judiciary was created as a nonpolitical branch. Writing as Publius in "The 
Federalist No. 78," Alexander Hamilton writes that the judiciary was the least dangerous of 
the three branches of government (Hamilton 1788). There is still much debate over the 
extent to which the judiciary should be able to function in a political role. The nature of the 
judiciary does not allow it to create of enforce laws, but only interpret them. As Hamilton 
writes: 
... [T]he judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least dangerous 
to the political rights of the Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy 
or injure them... It may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely 
judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the 
efficacy of its judgments (Hamilton 1788). 
Since 1803, the U.S. Supreme Court has been practicing judicial review. Many argue that by 
striking down federal laws, the Court has usurped legislative power. Whether one agrees or 
disagrees with that interpretation, to take away a justice's resources to write dissenting 
opinions so that courts may reach more consensual opinions would undoubtedly create more 
powerful majority opinions. If someone were concerned about courts "legislating from the 
bench" it would be wise to allow courts to employ more law clerks in order to weaken these 
opinions. 
The judiciary behaves more like the judiciary which Hamilton writes about when 
dissenting opinions are present. The majority of the court is forced to defend their position 
by engaging the dissent. If one were concerned that the addition of clerks would gives 
justices more resources to craft the law to their own policy preferences, they should 
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understand that by allowing for more disconsensus on courts, justices are made less capable 
of affecting radical change in the nation. 
The importance of minority opinions is also expressed by John Stuart Mill in his 
classic work On Liberty. Mill writes that in a democratic government in which the majority 
rules, the majority may wish to oppress a minority. Based on this fear of tyranny of the 
majority, Mill says that there is a need to limit the amount to which public opinion can 
interfere with individual liberty. To protect from this tyranny, Mill believes there should be a 
liberty of thought and discussion. He asserts that minorities should be able to openly 
disagree with majorities (Mill 1859, 931-938). 
Cass Sunstein writes on the importance of dissent in his 2003 work, Why Societies 
Need Dissent. Sunstein argues that conformity, unchecked by dissent, can produce harmful 
outcomes. A powerful example Sunstein uses is the Bay of Pigs invasion as an example of 
the dangers of conformity. According to Sunstein, President Kennedy never considered an 
alternative to invasion because his advisers did not offer an alternative. Arthur Schlesinger, 
Jr. speculated that it was because they were afraid of appearing soft. All of Kennedy's senior 
advisors told him to invade. Had just one told him otherwise, perhaps he would have reacted 
differently (Sunstein 2003, 1-3). 
Sunstein argues that judges are also vulnerable to the influences of their colleagues. 
Sunstein finds that in a three justice panel a good predictor of how a justice will vote is the 
party of the President who appointed him. Interestingly, an even better predictor of how a 
judge will vote is the party of the President who appointed the other two judges on the bench. 
A Republican appointee sitting with two other Republican appointees is more likely to vote 
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along stereotypical lines than a Republican appointee sitting with one other Republican 
appointee and one Democratic appointee (Sunstein 2003, 166-167). 
In their 1993 article entitled "The Supreme Court as a Countermaj oritarian 
Institution? The Impact of Public Opinion on Supreme Court Decisions", William Mi shier 
and Richard Sheehan explore empirical evidence on the roll of the Supreme Court as an 
institution counter to the public majoritarian view. They recognize there is an important 
question as to how the Court should behave as a countermaj oritarian institution. Using a 
time series analysis, Mi shier and Sheehan find a reciprocal and positive relationship between 
long-term trends in public opinion and U.S. Supreme Court decisions. In 1981, however, 
they find that relationship either disappears or reverses direction (Mishier and Sheehan 1993, 
90-91) 
Since 1981, public opinion has grown more liberal while the Court has become more 
conservative. Mi shier and Sheehan point out that it can be easily concluded that prior to 
1981 there was a relationship between public mood and attitudes on the Supreme Court, 
which either reverses or dissipates after the election of Ronald Reagan. They find that since 
1956, Courts have been responsive to public opinion, even when there is no change in Court 
personnel. There is a clear shift from a maj oritarian Court to a countermaj oritarian Court. 
This is curious as it seems presidents have always appointed justices who appear to be in line 
with their own policy preferences. Mi shier and Sheehan find that, due to the lag between 
elections and Supreme Court appointments, justices do not necessarily join the court when 
their appointer' s ideology is in line with public opinion. Based on this, it is possible for the 
Supreme Court to act as a countermaj oritarian institution (Mishier and Sheehan 1993, 95-98). 
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Not surprisingly, Sunstein find that justices' policy preferences matter when voting. 
His findings are consistent with the attitudinal models as well as Walter Murphy's theories 
on strategic interaction. Sunstein calls dissenting justices "potential dissenter-whistleblowers 
(185)." He writes that a dissenter-whistleblower reduces the likelihood of an opinion that is 
either incorrect or created on bad legal theory (184-186). In this, Sunstein presents another 
alternative reason justices may produce dissenting opinions. 
Dissent on the courts, like dissent in society, is a necessary tool for progress. It is 
consistent with American tradition to believe that giving minority opinions a voice is good 
for democracy. If this is true, why should this tradition not be present in the judiciary? As 
Sunstein correctly points out, consensus and conformity can often be very dangerous. Just as 
it is good when leaders are presented with more opinions by their advisors, it is also good for 
justices to be presented with more opinions, presumably by their law clerks. 
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Conclusion 
Bradley Best proved a causal relationship between law clerks and dissenting opinions 
on the Supreme Court as well as a causal relationship between support staff and 
nonconsensual opinion writing on the Supreme Court. Similarly I set out to find this 
phenomenon in state supreme courts. State supreme courts hold different institutional roles 
to the US Supreme Court. Their institutional role even varies with each other. Yet, their 
structure is similar enough to compare across courts. In my study I found results, consistent 
with Best's law clerk theory, suggesting that state courts produce more dissenting opinions. 
I also looked to writings on strategic interaction. Most, prevalently, Walter Murphy 
wrote that justices must play a strategic role in order to promote their policy preferences. In 
my research I found nothing to suggest that judges and justices do not pursue policy 
preferences. If Murphy's model is true, then the make up of a court's staff is very important. 
Since I find that courts with more law clerks produce more dissenting opinions, law clerks 
play a very important role in the way a justice must behave in order to pursue those 
preferences. A justice writing a majority opinion in a court with a small staff has fewer 
obstacles, as his colleagues are less likely to produce dissenting opinions; therefore, his 
opinion will meet little opposition and be likely to be followed by lower courts. A dissenting 
justice on the same court, however, faces a larger obstacle. The justice has little resources to 
produce an opinion as his staff is bogged down with other duties. Furthermore, his 
colleagues are less likely to dissent, so the dissenting opinion faces large obstacles. 
On a court with a large staff, a justice writing for the majority will face more 
obstacles. In order to get other justices to sign on to his opinion, he must craft it carefully, if 
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his colleagues disagree with a small part of the opinion; they are more likely to produce a 
dissenting opinion. Similarly, a justice who wishes to write a dissent has more resources 
available to produce an opinion if he disagrees with the majority of the court. Caseload will 
also affect a justice's strategical motivations in the same way. A justice writing for the court 
will have to factor in the caseload, when considering how much he will have to conform his 
opinion to the center of the court in order to keep members from filing dissenting opinions. 
Concerning the ethical question I raise about the presences of dissenting opinions, I 
conclude that nonconsensual opinion writing is crucial to a healthy judiciary. While there is 
concern that disconsensus weakens opinions, we have seen that justices are aware of this and 
in many important decisions, such as Brown they work hard to reach consensus, knowing that 
dissenting opinions will have an adverse affect on their policy goal. 
Further Research Questions 
A good study would be to explore the institutional roles of state supreme courts on an 
individual level and see how this affects consensual norms. I would predict that courts which 
hear more cases in their original jurisdiction will be skewed towards showing strong tradition 
of consensual norms, when that may not be the case in their appellate jurisdiction. Their 
institutional role should also help determine the relevance of the size of their caseload. 
Another study that would be worth while would be to do an intensive study of the 
California Supreme Court across several years dating back to before the court employed so 
many clerks. If my model holds true, consensus will increase as the number of law clerks 
decrease. This study should also look deeply at more cases and try and isolate any policy 
preferences of individual justices on the court. In my study I was unable to find any solid 
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voting blocks any court, so this may be difficult, however if someone were to conduct that 
study it would prove very interesting. 
In further studies, it would also be usefully to test other variables which might explain 
the variation in dissenting opinion writing. This research would be greatly amplified if one 
could control for factors such as polarity and state population. 
A study of cases appealed from state supreme courts to the United State Supreme 
Court could also prove interesting. One should find that cases with dissenting opinions were 
more likely to see further appeals. If this is not true, it might under mind some of the weight 
I and previous scholars have given to the importance of dissent. 
In Conclusion 
David Morales was sentenced to twenty years in prison based, partially, on a 
summation which two of the seven member of the California Supreme Court considered to be 
a blatant act of prosecutorial misconduct. The remaining five justices at least signed on to an 
opinion which stated that while they did not believe the prosecutor committed misconduct, 
the question was a close call. If David Morales' misfortune is a result of injustice, these 
dissenting opinions might help to set that injustice right. 
The actions of the judiciary affect real people. At the end of a long process, in all of 
these states, seven people in funny clothes decide what the law means. While we often try 
and assume they are working from a sort of divinely inspired objectivity, it is not consistent 
with what has been written about the judiciary. Judges and justices are fallible human beings 
with opinions, ideologies and policy preferences. I do not mean to fault justices for having 
such preferences, nor am I suggesting they should not be allowed to pursue policy 
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preferences, when justices ultimately must, through either activism or restraint, often play the 
role of a policy maker. Rather, I contend that if they must be policy makers, than they should 
be equipped with the best resources available to serve that roll. 
If law clerks allow justices to craft more dissenting opinions, I therefore conclude that 
courts are better served with more law clerks. There could be a dissent which would forever 
change the face of legal theory, which is never written simply because the justice either did 
not have time, or was trying to conform to the opinions of his or her colleagues. 
While my model also shows that small case loads allow for more dissent, I am timid 
to advocate for courts to hear fewer cases. If the ultimate goal is so that more opinions are 
heard, it does not logically follow that justices should hear fewer cases. While there is a 
danger of courts becoming too bogged down with fewer important cases, there is an even 
greater danger of important opinions not being written by justices, because the justice never 
heard the case. 
I attempted to create an empirical model to approach a normative question. While 
normative questions require an analytical response and one could come to a conclusion 
without looking at empirical data, my model does a great deal to show how this dilemma 
plays out practically. By approaching this question in this manner, I was able to provide a 
prescriptive conclusion. If one believes dissent is good for democracy, then it would be best 
to allow courts to have more law clerks. 
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